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INTFODUCTION

R gis DEbray, twenty-eight year old FTench Marxist
philosopher, now sits imprisoned for allegedly giving assistance to the late Che Guevara in his attempt at sparking revolution in Bolivia.

It is now of little significance whether

or not the Bolivian government's claim is true that Debray provid2d active assistance to the rebels, or whether it is true,
as Dt-bray contends, that he was simply an observer of Che's
activities.

These are political-legal points of interest which

were for all practical purposes decidrd upon by the Bolivian
government's sentEncing of Debray in October of 1967 to thirty
years confinement.
Of what interest then is RPgis Debray?
in the fact that Debray

regard~d

The answer lies

his revolutionary doctrine

as a progression beyond prior Marxist rr>volutionology.

The

title of his row-famous book, Revolution in the Rf volution?,
itself, makes obvious the fact that Debray believed he was
saying something new.

That his scheme seems to have failed in

Bolivia is of slight consequence, at least in
study.

s~ction

I of this

My interest lies not in preparing an exegesis on how

the doctrine failed to take into account Bolivia's airborne
1

2

troops or the powerful tentacles of the CIA's Bolivian branch,
for these are topics best reported by inquisitive and qualified
journalists.

Rath1'r, my aim is to view Regis D(' bray' s work

in relation to the: philosophical base from which it claims to
emerge, and upon which it claims to improve.
cours~,

Marxism.

This base is, of

Therefore, the central thrust of my examina-

tion will be to dFtermine the importance and3elevanci: of
D bray's philosophy within revolutionary Marxist thought.
In using the word "importance,

11

I mean Debray's signif-

icance as a philosophical product within a philosophy whose
history has been dotted

~ith

polemical confrontations, revision-·

ist tend;· ncies, and charges of dogmatic stagnation.

By claim-

ing his adherence to Marxism, he also claims to be a product
of, for instance, the controversies surrounding the Third International, or the historical
and the M:nsheviks.

~xchanges

between the Bolsheviks

And it is because Marxist thought is so

heavily interlaced with ideological differences that the labeling of Regis Debray a "Marxist" without further information
is of little meaning tc the serious observer of this sort of
affair.

It is only after an academic dissection is performed

3

upon Debray's "revolution in the revolution,

and it is viewed

side· by side with the historical progression of Marxist theory
and practice, that any and all importance can be given to
D~bray

as both an effect and a cause with revolutionary Marxism.

It as as an effect that Debray has importance: and it is as a
cause that he may have relevance.
To speak of relevance, as I do in Section II, implies
pertinence to some other thing.

In tho case of Regis Debray,

his relevance is to three entities:

(1) Marxist theory:

(2) contemporary Marxist-based govc,rnments and revolutionaries:
and (3) contemporary non-Marxist (or in most cases, anti-com-·
munist) governments. 1

In the case of category number one,

De: bray' s effect is upon a tenet basic to orthodox Marxism.

Despite polemics on various other issues, there exists little
heresy in the unity of theory and practice, and it is with

1Brcause reality is too spectrum - like to divide governments in as arbitrary fasion as here, I ask that this procedur0 be accepted here on journalistic expediency. Not important are the specific countries to which these categories
apply, but that there exists, within the complex arrangement of
nation·-states, a political division of this sort.

4

this point of doctrine Debray is concerned.

In fact, it is this

principle through which D:cbray is operating and simultaneously
commenting upon.

Categories two and three are affected by

Debray in a similar way.
tionaries,

und~rstandably,

Marxist-base(! governments and n:"voluare highly interested in the move-

ment of Marxist revolutionary theory and practice.

Although

hamstrung by the passions, principles, and behavior made

nee-

essary by their unavoidable participation with nation-state
power politics, 2 ccntemporary Marxists still regard revolution,
as ordered by dialectical materialism, the ultimate or decisive
agency for change in those portions of the world not yet governed
under a Marxist-communist arrangement.

As for non or anti-

communist (Marxist) governments, oE:bray's influence is mainly
in the area of increasing the instability of the status quo by
innovation the existing threat, revolutionary Marxism.

And in

as much as his philosophy alters, improves, or simply sustains

2For discussion of this point see John Plamanatz, Man
ana Society, Vol. 2, (NPW York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 3~'7-402

the existing threat 1 Debray is of interest to that which is
threatened, the non-communist portions of the world.
Hence, S:. ction I, in pursuing the importance of Regis
.Debray, will involve itself with the concept of the unity of
theory and practice, and his peculiar participation in the concEpt.

In its entirety, this section will consider Debray's

works, Revolution in the Revolution? and two shorter

~ssays,

as they have been published, and will at no time in this section
make relevant the apparent failure of his theory in the Bolivian
Guevara episode.

However, this is not to deny the importance

of Debray's theoretical "failure," for in terms of Marxian

theory and practice, a lesson has been taught.
This "lesson" will be the subject of Section II, where
we shall examine Regis Debray's relevance and the failure of

Debray' s theo,ry from a Marxian basis.

That is to say, we shall

" of his revolutionary scheme as
consider the impact in toto
observers in a revolutionary world.
Preferring to keep speculation to a minimum, our approach
will be generally directed toward bringing to the surf ace questions created by the efforts to Dibray to revolutionize the

6

revolution.

Although it may prove anti-·climatic, answers to

the questions raised will not be forthcoming in these pages.
'I'o

put forth "answers" would be QV<:rly presumptuous and com-

pletely out of context with the purpose of this study, which
aims at capturing the Marxist-Debray message.

The questions

will appear, but the answers will come about only as time moves
forward and while events take shape.

One thing is certain, how-

ever, and it is that the questions will be answered.

We must

remember, as Debray put it, "For the revolutionary, failure is
•

a springboard.

-:i

0

":!
-

-'Re::gis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?,
Grove Press, 1967), p. 23.

(New York:

7

As I have already hinted, the issue of

R~gis

Debray,

from a philoseiphical standpoint, is intimately bound up with
Marx's concept of knowledge through the unity of theory and
practice.

It would, however, be inappropriate ano a matter

0£ mis-emphasis to now launch a comprehensive discourse en the

many intricacies of this concept. 1

Nevertheless, because it

is essential that this fundamental element be fully appreciated,
I

will preface the beginning of our DEbray examination with

just enough words to sketch briefly the dimensions of this
concept as I perceive them and wish to apply them.
Because Marx was revolutionary in intent, he quite predictably opposed the materialism of the eighteenth century,

2

which provided neither explanation nor agency for development
and change.

His theories clearly required a philosophy having

1oiscussions of this concept may be found in the following sources:
R.M. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism,
{Baltimore: Penquin Books, 1~63), pp. 57-60.
Karl Marx, "Theses on Feurerbach" appears in Howard Selsam
and Harry Martel (E'ds.) , ReadPr in Marxis'.t Philosophy (New York:
Inte:·rnational Publishers, lS-63).
2Represented by, for example, Holbach, La Mettrie, and
Diderot.
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the following attributed2
"scientific";

(1) materialistic, it has to bl:

(2) determined, at least to the degree that the

Revolution was inevitable; and

(3) non-mechanistic, at least

to the extent that it somehow resolved the tension between
determinism and free will by making man more than simply a
pa~sive

element in the process of progress.

It is to this

final point that the Unity of 'l'hE-ory and Practice concept has
relevance.
We must bear in mind that to Marx the material world is
reality.

However, while the preceding materialists posited

the notion that human knowledge of the external world, as well
as all ideas about it, was produced by the impact of sensations
upon our mind -- a passive procedure -- Marx. taught in his

'I'heses on :t'euerbach that these sensations provided only stimuli
to knowledge which completed itself in action.
belit~ved

In short, Marx

that we perceive a thing as a part of the process of

acting upon it.

This is the unity 9f theory and practice,

Marx's activist theory of knowledge which asserts that knowledge

9

iS firmly bound up with action (or praxi~. 3

Writing in

Jhe Theory and Practice of Communism, R. N. Hunt elucidates
on this matter:

••• Marxists have always insisted that theory and
action are one. A theory of which the truth is not
confirmed by action is sterile, while action which is
divorced from theory is purposeless, the two stand
in much the same relation to one another as do faith
and works in Christian the~loqy.4
••• it is practice which alone dtermines the truth
of theory •••• but on the other hand, theory equally

determines practice. since, if the theory is wrong,
its error will inevitably reveal itself in the sphere
of action. 5
The key to understanding lies in remembering the materialistic basis of Marxism.

As has been pointed out already,

the materialist approach regards matter as primary and the
mind as secondary, as an entity formed on the basis of matter.
Hence, as man engages in self-preservation, his ideas of his

3 This Marxian concept is one which has remained compar-

atively unchanged since its appearance. Mao. however, has
claimed to "develop 11 the concept further in his essay of 1937,
0n P:':'actice". But, the addition is not substantial, and an
explanation unnecessary here. See Stuart Schram, The Political
Thought of M!o-tse-tunq, (New Yorke Praeger, 1963), pp. 124-128.
11

4Hunt, op. cit., p. 59.
5 tbid.

10

existence and his methods of living follow.

Practice comes

before theory.
It was simply out of organizational preference that I
reviewed Marx•s Theory and Practice concept.

For with this

For with this in mind, I believe we are now able to proceed
on into the words of Debray with a foundation upon which to
stand.

And as time goes on, the relevance of what has just

preceded will become fully apparent.
At the very start of his book, Debray makes plain two
points:

One, that he disavows theory prior to the military

actions of a guerrilla foco. 6

With no time wasted, Debray

clearly alienates the intellectual, as well as the romantic,
from a successful American revolution.
reminisce and thaorize

Both being prone to

a sin of the gravest sort -- they

are apt to fall victim to History's "advances in disguise".
As Debray allegorizes, history, "appears on stage wearing the
mask of the preceding scene," and it is the politicos,

6 Roughly translated from Spanish, it refers to a center
of Guerrilla operations, as opposed to a military base.
(French: Foyer)

11

intellectuals, and pure theorists who uselessly catalogue
pieces of script,

s~

to speak, which are inappropriate, and

even deadly, t() the nee-as of contemporary revolution in Latin
America.

Henca, we are left understanding at the outset that

r•:=volut ir'nary theory drawn fr.om experience foreign in time and
geo9raphy to

the~

strugqle at hand is DP bray' s foremost enemy.

Th<? second point established early by Debray is that
the armed guerrilla unit, the foco, is the military and political a::nti::r of the revolutiona:i::-y

mov~ment.

Operating upon the

premise that practice begets best theory, the only authentic

agency for evolving theory, according to Debray, is that agency
engaged in confronting the existing enemy, the guerrilla unit.

By virtue of the fact that it is involved in deadly struggle
with the army of the oppressor, the foco produces by necessity
the rev8lutionary theory appropriate to the situation at hand.
There are implications arising from this approach which
appear at once.

The role of the urban based "party" is reduced

to being a distant secondary position.
sons unable to

ao

For as a body of per-

meaningful battle with the bourgeoisie, they

inherit the aura of "legal Marxists," a term used in

12

ideological confrontations to denote those who would rely upon
an evolution of sorts to the ignorance of revolutionary tact.
More specifically, an urban-based "party" -- very often the
Communist Party -- at best, arrives at and transmits erroneous
"theoretical
periences.

11

conclusions and programs based upon foreign ex-

And at worst, the urban, non-revolutionary Party

becomes the unknowing tcol of the oppressors.

The·

Part~~' s

reluctance or inability to attaC'k the basis of its oppressor's
state, i.e., the basic institutions, neuters its potential as
an embryo for revolution and beyond.

Debray plainly expresses

the kern•:-1 arounc: wh:i.ch ht' has elaborated when he says that,

"the union of thE"<n7 an,-=i practice is

no~

an

;~nevi.tabillty

but

a battle, and no battle is won in advance. 117
Debray ;;ic>ints out that the "sld guard" which he opposes,

following :i. ts habit of insat:Lably theorizing, is responsible
for the :wti0n of armed

.S.~Je:.!1.:S_~.

Briefly, this is a system

which is looked upon by Debray as "suffering from a profusion

------------··-- ---------·------··-----·
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of admirable sacrifices," but inept as a revolutionary tact.
It attempts to bring everyone within a rural area into the
armed struggle, creating a mass guerrilla force of men, women,
and children: it aims at establishing an initial zone in which
the opporessor's army lacks control: and it appears to be
chiefly a "holding action".

Debray finds several shortcomings:

(1) The scheme's success depends upon a tacit non-aggression

pact between aggressor and rebel:

(2)

it threatens the lives

of peasants within the zone by denying the organic separateness of the armed unit to the civilian populationr

(3) it

is open to encirclement: and most importantly,

it has

(4)

failed in, for example, southern Columbia (1964) and Bolivia
(1965).

As Debray remarks,

A self-defense zone when it is neither the result
of a total or partial military defeat of enemy forces,
nor protected by a guerrilla front constantly on the
offensive, is no more than a colossus with feat of clay. 8
The brunt of Debray's attack on the system of armed
self-defense is taken by the Trotskyites, who ai::E: apparently
the vanguard of the "old guard."

·rhe common denominator shared

by proponents oi armed self-defense and Trotskyites is a

14

reliance upon the trade union as the organizational base, motive
force, and spearhead of the class struggle.
heresy for two reasons.

To Debray this is

The first, of course, i3 that it em-

phasizes the urban units who have a history of being "corrupted"
by urban politics: secondly, and most importantly, it is an
approach born not of praxis, but of fond and hopeful recall
of a currently non-existent situation.

The harshness with

which Debray denounces the Trotskyi.tes is understandable,
being that the Trotskyites described by Debray clearly seem to
be dogmatizing the events and arguments of the revolutionary
ideas formulated at the turn of the century.
Let us look more closely at the position Debray attributes
to the Trotskyites.

It begins by reducing the role of the

guerrilla from primary to, at best, secondary.

The task of

forming factory and peasant committees, which will have as
their purpose economic agitation, becomes the primary path
of the revolution.

As the class antagonisms increase in

intensity, strikes and general uprisings in cities and mountains gradually and ultimately serve to overthrow the bourgeoisie.

The revolutionary path, quite obviously, runs through

15

the doors of the union hall, so to speak.
Hence. and for the reasons already 3tated, Regis DPbray's
antagonism towards the Trotskyi tes is q1.:d te predictable.

And

to the degree that past attempts in Latin America at semi-legal

approaches have resulted in corrupting the entire movement,
Debray represents an expected doctrinal reaction.

He firmly

claims to adhere to the evolution of theory praxis, and therefore makes virtually sacred the form through which praxis shall
be realized.
In which way does Debray's program

diff~r?

Interestingly

enough, it takes on a distinct Leninist hue in that it is clandestine, secretive, and select.

The guerrilla unity functions

independently of the civilian (peasant) population, thus relinquishing a need or obligation to defend it.

The scle aim

of the movement is the seizure of power, and its distinguishing
feature is that the guerrilla foco, a single political-military
group, serves as the embryo in which is contained the future
revolutionary party and state.

The military-guerrilla foco,

as it experiences the struggle of seizing power from the existing state and of developing pertinent theory, forms a counter-

16

state.

It is precisely on this point, the counter-state, that

Debray's importance within Marxist thougl"it comes directly to
the fore.

Far

unlik~:-

E;!ither "economic Marxists" whc

stres~ed

the eventual-·decay-of-capi talisrn approach or the "legal Marxists'

who stressed the participation··Wi th-parliament approach, Debray'
language aeems to be a Leninist-like adaptation to the revolutionary struggle in Latin America.

His emphasis on the aeizure

of power might well mean that Debray represents revolutionary
Leninism as revised and adapted for South America.

His

philos~

ophy places him squarely within the'hon-orthodox" wing of
Marxism-Leninism, and his creation (dar€· I say addition?) of
a revolutionaru cc.tmter-state places him squarE'lV in line for

close examination.
Why i9 the

c~unter-~tate

unique?

Essentially, this

aspect of aoctri.ne differs fy-om other social:tst concepts in
that is -:Jlaces little hope in an evolution of society or in
a revolution. led by a strata of the pooulation within the
oppresseC! society.

Rather than a counter-s9_q_iet_y, whi.ch many

interpret entails the pure se:i.zure o'!:: exist;in_g_ state power.
Unlike Lenin's cognizance in What Is To Be Done of a

17

"consciousness" (althouqh only of a trade-unionist sort) among
the workers in the first few years of the 1900's, and uplike
Mao Tse Tungs• observations that the pre-revolutionary Chineee
proletariat was "the most politically conscious class in
Chinese society." 9 Debray disregards the matter of consciousness among the people, at least in the initial stage of the
struggle.

This is not to say, however, that Debray is without

concern for mass consciousness.

But as Debray views it, the

armed unit will, by its military action, serve as a "small motor'
and activate the latent consciousness

a~ong

the people.

If Devray•s philosophy deserves to be regarded as a
"revolution in the revolution," much of the credit for being
so must be given to this aspect of "consciousness" in his
program.

For in a very distinct way, Debray's de-emphasis on

mass awareness runs counter to Marx, Lenin, 10 Mao Tse Tung, and

9ouote appears in an excerpt from Mao's "The Chinese
Communist Party." See Schram, 9.2.• cit., p. 192.
10Lenin's program, of course, was baaed on a small, secret
party concept. But, Lenin also gave notice, if only as lip
service, that his Bolsheviks needed mass consciousness. See
Lenin Selected Works. Vol. 2 (New York: International Publishers
1967), pp. 365 - 370.

18

Ho Chi Minh.

The importance of this consciousness amon9 the

masses lies in the f•et that it provided a legitimacy distinct
from uputachiam" or "mass actionu movements which, paradoxically
Debray denounces in his earlier piece, Latin J\p!erica! The Long
Mtrch.

I say uparadoxically 0 because Debray's formula exoner-

ates the disreqardinq of mass consciousness -- the foundation
of Marxist revolutionary legitimacy -- in favor of military
confrontation prior to mass awareness.

The essence of this

point is illustrated by Debray's use of Che Guevara's words,
"It is not always necessary to wait for all the conditions of
the revolution to be qivenr the insyrrest.ional foco can create
tbem. 11
This point is further exposed in his chapter titled
"Armed Propaganda."

It is here that Debray•s differences with

preceding Marxist revolutionoloqy become apparent.

Writes

Debray:
In other words, armed propaganda follows military
action but does not precede it. Armed propa9anda baa
more to do with the internal than with the external
9uerrilla front. The main point is that under present
conditions the most important form of propa9anda is

1111frxist Strategy in Latin a.merica, p. 41.

19

successful military action.

12

Clearly, the above statement places Debray in theoretical
opposition to so-called orthodoxy.

We have only to remember

that Marx, in Section IV of the Manifesto, spoke of the communists' role in promoting class consciousness as a prelude to

overt revolutionary techniques.

Or we can recall Lenin's

What Is To Be Done, where he quite emphatically reveals the
vanguard's duty to expose and a9itate the contradictions which
lead to oppression between the bourgeoisie and the proleteriat.
Indeed, the one constant we find in communist theory is the
duty of communists, when objective conditions dictate, to
a9itate and hasten the intensification of the subjective conditions (inclinations) for revolution which the objective
conditions have produced.

This was constant at least until

Regis Debray emerged.
Reasserting his premise that conditions peculiar to
Latin America and distinct from Asia and Africa must give

12

Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?, op cit. p. 56.
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rise to differing approaches to revolution, Debray goes on to
herald the fact that, "Fidel did not hold a single political
rally in his zone of operations. 1113
American peculiarities?

What are these Latin

The most striking peculiarity is that,

unlike China and Viet Nam, Latin America is victim of an
advanced type of imperialism.

Where China and Viet Nam were

involved in liberation struggles against foreign colonialists,
the people of Latin America have no on-going military effort
directed at a foreign occupational power.

Instead, they are

a highly dispersed and sparsely situated people who live under
a virtually unassailable police-army force of oppression.

An

attempt to simply politically indoctrinate the population would
greatly reduce the effectiveness of the already small and select
guerrilla band.

Also. it would expose the cadres engaged in

indoctrination of the rural population to entrapment and.
even more seriously, infiltration by informers.

And in addition

to the latent dangers to the foco, armed propaganda techniques
in Latin America would invite serious reprisals upon the

13 Ibid., p. 54.

21

"strategic" villages by the regime in power.

The conclusion,

according to Debray, is the need for a revolutionary force to
"prove" the vulnerability
military confrontation.

C.)f

the existing regime by direct

Only after the guerrilla foco has

weakened the oppressor's hold can it engage in overt propaganda

methods and large-sqale enlistment programs.
The Debray procedure of practically investing 1So0
prior revolutionary concepts continues in his discussion of
the guerrilla base.

Here he shuns the idea of fixed bases of

operation in favor of non-permanent poisitions.

In Debray•s

own wordsi

_•• for the guerrilla force to attempt to occupy
a fixed base or to depend on a security zone, even one
of several thousand square kilometers in area, is, to
all appearances, to deprive itself of its best weapon,
mobility, to permit itself to be contained within a
zone of operations, and to allow the enemy to use its
most effective weapons.1 4
Debray is careful to cite definite reasons for disavowinq fixed bases, a successful concept Eor the revolutions
in China and Viet Nam.

14

As Debray views it, fixed-positions

Ibid., pp. 62-63.

22

strategies require an extensive territory having poor communications to the backlands, high density of rural population,
the existence of a common border with a sy1npathetic cou11try,
and the absence of airborne enemy troops -- none of which, says
Debray, can be found in Latin America.
The alternative to a fixed guerrilla base is vividly
portrayed Debray's remark., "In the initial stage the base of
support is in the guerrilla fighter's knapsack."
nique of inversion regarding
by

th~

15

His te:ch-

guerrilla base is defended

his relating an experience of the Cuban revolution, Debray's

exemplar supreme, in which Fidel Castro's preparing of a base
camp prior to an extensive period of mobile encounters with
Batista's troops proved erroneous and

pr~mature.

It was only

after a year and a half that the guerrilla unit led by Castro
had gained sufficient control over a zone of operations and
were thus able to prepare a fixed base within the zone.
The point wished to be made by Debray is, of course,
that the theoretical necessity, based especially upon Mao

Tae Tung•s experience in China, of preparing a base camp is
15

Ibid. I p. 65
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dangerous and useless superimposition of strategy.

Below is

a lengthy quote of Debray made on the matter of base camps.
The excerpt, however, is equally relevant to his entire philosophieal posture.

And for this reason, it has been included

so as to allow a 9limpse of Debray speaking on his own philosophy:
That an intellectual, especially if he is bourgeois,
should speak of strategy before all else, is normal.
Unfortunately, however, the riqht road, the only feasible
one, sets out from tactical data, rising gradually toward
the definition of strategy. The abuse of strategy and the
lack of tactics is a delightful vice, characteristic of
the contemplative man -- a vie~ to which we, by writing
these lines, must also plead guilt~. All the more ~eason
to remain aware of the inversion Lauthor•s emphasi.!f of
which we are victims when we read theoretical works.
They present to us in the form of principles and a rigid
framework certain so-called strategic concepts which in
reality are the result of a series of experiment3 of
a tactical nature. Thus it is that we take a result for
a poif.!.:L_q_f departu;:!_. Lemphasis added/ For a revnlutionary
group, military strategy springs first of all from a
combination of political and social circumstances, from
its own relationship with the population, from the limitations of the terrain, from the opposing forces and their
weaponry, etc. Only when these details have been mastered
can seri011s plans be made. F:f.nally -- and this is even
truer for guerrilla forces than for regular armies -there are no details in the action or, of you prefer,
everything is a matter of detai1. 16

16 Ibidl, p. 60.

I
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Debray's pattern is unchanged when he turns to a discuss ion of the gueri·illa focc 's relation to "the f'arty."

The

party, from sheer tradition, is the urban-based revolutionary
organization which formulates policy based upon analysis and
interpretation of the class struggle, participates in exist-·
ing politics to varying degrees, and retains

c~ntralcbmination

over any guerrilla operation taking place in the hills.

This

is the "party" Mao Tse 'I'ung spoke of in his, The Struq9le in
Chingkanq Mountains, 17 and it is the "party" of Ho Chi Minh

today.
1 P.

ment. · -·

Debray finds several errors in this tactical arrangeIt must be remembered, however, that Debr.ay is ope,ra-

ting upon the premise that only through praxis --- the acting

out by revolutionaries -- can theory be formulated and/or
tested.

Hence, the inversion by D0bray cE the status given

17Cohen, Communism of Mao-Tse--Tung,
of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 53.

(Chicago: University

18Problems perceived by Debray are: (1) descent to the
city by foco leaders exposes them to ca_pturer (2) extraordinary
dependence upon the city by the guerrillas, logistically and

militarily1 and (3) lack of single command which, in turn, produces an uncoordinated urban-rural effort.
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to the urban-centered party and that of the guerrilla foco is
quite loqical and in keeping with demands of doctrinal consis-

tency.

That the unit performing the military confrontation

should be subjected to the superimposed theory (and domination)
of the urban party, which has dared little or nothing in the
way of meaninqful confrontation, contradicts the Debrayan
perspective of Marx's theory of knowledge, i.e., the unity of
theory and practice.
Debray's list of reasons for opposing the party appear
to be, on the surface, basically tactical in nature and thus

need not be listed verbatum.

What is of prime importance,

though, is that his opposition is not tactical in fact, but
firmly philosophical.

Expectedly, while discussing the

"artifical leadership of an improvised political front,

11

Debray reveals an opinion of .. party" members:
••• and such people are not yet liberated from the
old obsession: they believe that revolutionary awareness and organization must and can in every case precede revolutionary acticn.19

19Debray, Revolution, op, cit., p. 83.
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In diecuasin9 the nature of the Party, Debray makes
two points which illuminate the practical considerations within
x,atin America.

These considerations serve to reinforce hia

philosophical dedication to praxis.

J'irst, Debray notes that

•the initially 9reat disproportion between the strength of the
revolutionary forces and t!dlt of the entire repreasion
ism•

20

~echan-

.•

makea revolution a concern, not of .aaas .combatants, but

of experts grouped into ...11 cadrea.

Secondly, Debray reminds

his readers that the young i-•voluti.onaries in Lat.in Aaet:ica
lack the loft9 political experience of the sort he feels is
required for the future in Latin America.

He disavows t.he

"pure" politician for hi• inability to lead an armed atruggle.
Again, revealin9 the philosophical baeis of his

p~ogram.

as

opposed to llei.ft9 eaaentially tactical, Debray asaerta, "By
the experience •cquired in leading a guerrilla group, they

L-;pure"

mili~ry
20.

ll2i4·,

21 Ibid.,

ra.eii become
p.

ae.

P· a~..;·

politicians as well. "21

!this
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statement, as do others scattered throughout his writings,
emphasize the attainment of knowledqe (and theory) through
action (praxis).

This is clearly Debray's message when he

denounces the Party, and it is so when he decries the continuing
existence of alliances by the Party with other segments of the
society.

Labeling them "outworn, discredited Lan,g/ eroded

by failure."

Debray rejects the theory of the alliance of

four classes: association with the national bourgeoisie: and
the prevailing contempt in many quarters for the peasantry.
There are three points of significance raised by Debray's
attack on the prevailing theories and ideas just mentioned.
In rejecting as not acceptable the "alliance" concept, Debray
plainly follows throuqh, and is thus quite consistent, with
his repudiation of theory drawn from foreign practice.

More

specifically, however, he is stationing himself out of doctrinal
alignment with Lenin, Mao Tse Tung, and Ho Chi Minh

the

three foremost Marxist revolutionaries from whom "orthodoxy"
can be determined.
Beginnin9 with Lenin, we can see, for example, in
his Preliminary Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question 22 that
2

2,.ppears in Lenin Seleted Works, Vol. 3, 22.• cit.,

428-438.
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he was well aware of the peasantry.

Lenin, reflecting his

f.1,

1"

·.~

·10

analysis of thj peasantry, was sure to cite differences bet-

~

Ir

::1'
:l,i'

!~

·.·,1.,·.

ween mere toilers of the soil and those owning small plots,

~

·ll.r.

medium plots, and those known as GrossbauErn (big peasants).

f:,':
')'
::

Only the latter two, the medium and big landowners, represented threats to the proletarian revolutioQ.

The smaller land

owners, as well as the simple toiler, were, according to
Lenin's diagnosis, valuable allies to the struggle.
Although it is little discussed, Lenin also looked to
elements within the pourgeoisie for revolutionary comradeship,
Below is an excerpt from his The Staqes. Trends. And Prosnects
of The Revolution of 1906:
The labor movement flares up into a direct revolution,
while the liberal bourgeoisie has already united in a
Constitutional-Democratic party and thinks of stopping
the revolution by compromising with Tsarism. But the
radical elements of the bourgeoi.sie and petty bourgeoisie are inclined to enter into an alliance with the
proletariat for the !ontinuation of the revolution ••••
(author's emphasis) 2
Despite Lenin's allusion to such an alliance notion,
it was with Mao Tse Tung that the concept truly surfaced.
Although there is little question that Mao's formation of
the alliance was based upon Lenin's earlier doctrinal
23

Fxcerpt appears in Cohen, .QE.· cit., p. 50.

, I

29

suggestions regarding the peasantry and bourgeoisie, not to
ignore Stalin's pertinent remarks.

24

Mao Tse Tung is given

full credit for applying in practice a revolutionary movement
made up of bouregois elements under the leadership of the vanguard proletariat.

One has only to read Mao's Analysis of All

Classes in Chinese Society

25

to perceive the extent to which

Mao Tse Tung relied upon an alliance approach:
The whole of the petty bourgeoisie, the· semiproletariat, and the proletariat are our friends,
our true friends. As to the vacillating middle
26
bourgeoisie ••• its left wing may become our friend.
The Vietnamese conflict provides an example of the
alliance notion in total dominance, at least as an
concept.

a?~nounced

Contained within an anonymously written pamphlet

published by the National Liberation Front in 1967, we can
detect frequent reference to the alliance idea.

Ju~qing

from the following paragraph, one could not help but conclude
that the alliance principle appears to be the declared
24 stalin:

"Hence, the Task of the Communist elements iri
the colonial countries is to link up with the revolutionary
elements of the bourgeoisie •••• " See, Cohen, Ibid., p. 51.
25
Appears in Schram, .QJ2.. cit., pp. 143-147.
26

Ibid. I p. 146.

30

philosophical cornerstone to the National Liberation Front's
movement in Viet Nam:
The force that guarantees the fulfillment of the
above task of fighting against U.S. aggression to
save the country is our great national union. The
South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation constantly stands for uniting all social strata and
classes, all nationalities, all political par~ies,
all organizations, all religious communities, all
patriotic personalities, all patriotic and progressive indi~iduals and forces irrespective of
political tendency, in order to struggle together
against the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys,
wrest back 0~7 sacred national rights, and build up
the country.
The purpose of this philo-historical
as

!

sketc~

is,

mentioned a short while back, to show the degree to

which Regis Debray's repudiation of the alliance principle
stands aside from the thrust of Marxist revolutionology.
quite obviously, Debray believes the Latin American situation to be exceedingly distinct from prior events and
experience.
The second point of significance I wish to examine
concerns Debray's disdain for the evolutionary elements
within the Latin American socilaist movement.

As a matter

27 Political Programme of the South Viet Nam National
Front for Liberation (South Viet Nam: Giai Phong Publishing,
1~67),

p. 13.
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of fact, this issue is closely coupled with the third point:
past de-emphasis of the peasants' role.
matters are best treated together.

Therefore, both

For when so taken, these

twin issues provide substance for considerable analysis, which
in turn fosters an understanding of Debray's importance as
a Marxist philosopher.

We may begin by focusing on the evolutionary trends
within Latin America.

It is unquestionable that leftists of

the past, and even today, have engaged in activities somewhat
less dramatic than guerrilla warfare and considerably closer
1,
1

to that of a trade unionist movement. E'ven today, we can rEad

il·

111,
,,,I,,

•I''

accounts of such activities.

For example, a member of the

Nicaraguan Socialist Central Committee urges as part of the
Party's program, measures,
To create and consolidate the different legal
organizations waging a struggle in defense of the
28
specific demands of the peasants •.•. (emphasis added)

. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

To make the most of existing P9§sibilities
for legal work.
(emphasis added)--

28

.

Luis Sanchez, "Nicaraguan Communists in Van of
Liberation Movement." See World Marxist Review, February,
1~68, p. 37.
29

.

Ibid.
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Another example can be found in the words of a
prominent member of Haiti's People's Unity Party.

Here

we are able to discover, in addition to a decided reliance
upon the Party, an obvious inclination towards Mao Tse
Tung's alliance concept:
Recognizing the need for armed struggle as the
dFcisivefurm of revolutionary action in Haiti, our
Party advanced the following guiding principle:
'Greater Qolitical work among the masses must be the
pivot of the preparations for the armed struggle.'
We must make the most of the negligible opportunities
for legal work, carry on underground activity as
effective as possible, do everything to strengthen
our Party and awaken thE political consciousness
of as many people as possible.30
(emphasis added)

li
1

'The armed frc,nt is therf'fore designed to become,
in view of its organization and discipline, the
broadest form of a people's union, including
patriots of all trends .••• • 31
(emphasis added)
So, of what significance is it that Debray, unlike
the indigenous Latin American Marxists just reviewed, shuns
semi-legal participation and political works, and places
instead, the entire spotlight on armed, clandestine
guerrilla warfare to the extent of denying any initial
value to the Party movement?

The importance of Debray's

30saintigene Guillaume, "Haiti and The Revolution."
See, Weirld Marxist Rc:view, February, 1~68, p. 43.
31
Ibid • , p • 4 2 .
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approach on the philosophical level flows not so much from
what he says explicitly---much of which is on tactics and has,
subsequently, been placed in serious question---but from what
ramifications can be deduced from his having to say something
in the first place.
In this sense, Regis Debray is long expected doctrinal
first-response to Marxism's encasement within the nation-·state
arrangement.

And as were Trotsky's permanent revolution and

Lenin's law of unequal and uneven development early theoretical
expression of apprehension regarding Russia's continuing
existence in a "capitalist world"---overlooking the more
generic demon presented by the nation-state arrangement---the
Soviet Union has proceeded in practice to hedge somewhat on
its intellectual honesty when overlooking the "imperialist
potential" i.e., the need and desire of increaseJ national
power they possess ipso facto as a nation-state,
the absence of capitalist investments.

d~spite

The Soviet Union also

has blinded itself to the pervasive effect State politics
has had, and continues to have, upon the impulse of oppressed
nations to disentangle themselves from that which oppresses the ,
in as much as the Soviet Union "politics" with virtually all
the "capitalist" nation-states as do they with her.

In brief,

34

the demands of State have had priority over the ideals of
the socialist movement.

With this in mind, one could say

that Debray represents the Third World's implicit voicing of
the belief that the nation-state arrangement---its necessary
preoccupation with self-interest---has hindered, perhaps
even inadvertently, the movement of independence and freedom.

It is worth noting that within much of the "radical"

student movements throughout Europe and the UniteC. States
there exists an obvious renunciation of nationalistic perspective and an emphasis instead upon a horizontal,
international perspective---a sort of man to man approach.
It appears that the direction of the new politics, as
embryonic as it seems, is away from obtaining images
of the world and its problems from the mirrors of ones, own
government, but rather from looking directly across at the
world with un-nationalizaed eyes.

More on this line of thougrt

in Section I I .
This problem Debray is attacking, that of Marxist
parties intertwining themselves into the national State
fabric, can be '.:raced to discussions engaged in during the

Second Comintern Congress (1920).

It was during this period

that Lenin issued his most concise statements regarding the

r
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"backward" and colonial nations.

And as it now seems, it

was Lenin's insistence upon domination of the struggles by
the urban and industrial proletariat pursuing the .formation
of model Soviets which led to the "Marxist Establishment" in
Latin America.

In the Preliminary Draft Theses on the

Agrarian Question,

32

a major document of the Comintern

(Third International) reflecting Lenin's view, we read the
words:
Only the urban and industrial proletariat, led by
the Communist Party, can liberate the working masses
of the countryside from the yoke of capital and
landed proprietorship from ruin and the imperialist
wars which will inevitably break out again and again
if the capitalist system remains. There is no
salvation for the working masses of the country!ide
except in alliance with the communist proletariat,
and unless they give the latter devoted support in
its revolutionary struggle to throw off the yoke of
the landowners (the big landed proprietors) and the
bourqeoisie. 33 (emphasis added)
This excerpt, howevel', does not re.veal the full
story.

Lenin was well aware of the peasants' potentialities.

He was careful to include in the document a statement saying
that the revolution •
••• cannot be achieved unless the class struggle is
carried into the countryside, unless the rural
working masses are united about the Communist Party
of the urban proleJ!riat, and unless they are trained
by theproletariat.
33

34

36

Several observations are in order.

First, Lenin

places responsibility for the revolutionary mission with
the urban proletariat.

S condly, Lenin regarded the Com-

munist Party--an organization he tied to the International-as a representative of the revolution and, thirdly, Lenin
strongly favored collaboration with bourgeoisie-nationalist
elements within the backward nations.

Says Lenin:

The Communist International must enter into a
temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in the
colonial backward countries, but should not merge
with it, and should under all circumstances uphold the
independence of the proletajian movement even if it is
in its most embryonic. form. 5
Now Ught is being shed on the situation.

Indeed,

the course of the revoluticn, according to Lenin, was to be
proletarian-nationalistic and was ta involve the peasants
in so far as the proletariat was to "teach" them their missio
Much like the parties and Trotskyites today in Latin
America, Lenin never held for a peasant vanauard.

In the

Preliminary Draft Theses he reminds us of the Russian experience and lectures that the mass strike method is "al one
capable of rousing the countryside from its lethargy ••. and
revealing to them in a vivid and practical manner the
35

Ibid • I p • 4 2 7 •

37
importance of their alliance with the urban workers."

36

However, the revolutionary proletariat, the vanbuard,
was still to understand that "the deepest of petty-bourgeois
prejudices" were inherent among the peasants, and that
complete victory over capitalism would not be achieved
unless both the proletariat and the working people in all
37
countries united.
The meaning of all this is that Lenin's
general doctrinal posture provided a basis from which revolutionology evolved in China and Viet Nam.

We can plainly see

the culmination of a program based upon Party, Party control
and bourgeois-nationalistic emotions in the socialist
revolutions just mentioned.
The essence of Debray's tact, with its guerrilla foco
and rural emphasis, can be found in those same early
discussions so dominated by Lenin.

An Indian politician

and Marxist revolutionary, Nath Manabendra Roy, forwarded a
thesis at the Second Comintern Congress which differed
with Lenin's thesis on one important matter; It emphasized
37 1n his The Attitude of Social Democracy Toward the
Peasant Movement, written in 1905, Lenin stateda Wi support
the present movement in so far as it is revolutionary and
democratic. We are making ready (making ready at once,
immediately) to fight it in so far as it becomes reactionary and anti-proletarian •••• " See Cohen, .2l2.· .£t!:_., p. 4.

r
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agitation among the peasant masses, as coposed to Lenin's
preoccupation with urban activities and nationalist leaders.
Where Lenin stated, "The Communist International should support
bourgeois-democratic national movements in colonial backward
countr i es ••• , "38

Roy held that "the real strength, the

foundation, of the liberation movement cannot in the colonies
be forced within the narrow frame of bourgeois-democratic
nationalism."

39

Roy posited the notion that communists must

organize peasants and workers of backward countries into
revolutionary organizations which, while preventing the
domination of the mass struggle by nationalists, will assist
a class conscious proletariat in its attempt to by-pass
bourgeois nationalism and its accompanying factor, capitalism.
As noted historian E. H. Carr relates to us, Roy's theses
were not in contradiction to those of Lenin, but ·•they were
markedly different in emphasis and, on the vital issue of
tactics,

seemed to point to a different conclusion."

This

conclusion, simply stated, was that supporting of bourgeoisdemocratic revolutions, as proposed by Lenin, would merely
38Lenin Selected Works, Vol. 3,_..Q2.,

.£.!S.., p. 426.

39E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. 3,
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1953), p. 256.
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serve to give strength to the capitalist order, and that the
task of the communists would be better realized by opposing
nationalistic trends.
Roy's two premises were that the' workers and peasants
of backward countries could be won for communism, "not through
capitalist devdlopment, but through the development of class
consciousness,"

41

and that the bourgeoisie in capitalist

countries prevented the proletarian revolution only by subsidizing their workers out of the profits gained through
colonial exploitation.

Hence, the struggle must be directed

against the bourgeois State power by means of an alliance
of peasants and workers, directed by the latter, but

conducted in the backlands.
By turning to Debray's piece in the New Left Review,
"Latin America:

The Long March,"

42

we see that the matter

of the revolution in Latin America being either bourgeoisdemocratic or socialist, a question which naturally arises
from the preceding discussion, is given attention by Debray_

We quote his words:

41L.!_.,
b'd
p. 256.
42

September-October, 1965, Issue #33.

r
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The nub of the problem lies not in the initial
programme of the revolution but in its ability to
resolve in practice theproblem of State power before
bourqeois-democratic stage, and not after •••• In
short, it seems evident that in South America the
bourgeois-democratic stage presuppose! the destruction of 1he bourgeois State apparatus, 3 (emphasis added)
What Debray is drivinq at is that the situation
in Latin America, unlike conditions in Asia and Africa,
presents a unique and original challenge to Marxists.

Where

in Asia and Africa the struggle against imperialsim takes
the form of

a front against foreign occupation, the liberation

struggle in Latin America has been preceded by a period of
"political independence."

The struggles in Latin America

proceed largely as civil wars and, as Debray points out,
"the social base is therefore narrower, and the ideology
consequently better defined and less mixed with bourgeois
influence •••• "

44

However, as a result of the phenomenon,

it has become necessary, according to Debray, to repudiate
and replace existing institutions rather than participate
in their function.

It has been just this refusal to parti-

cipate in a protracted guerrilla stru9qle designed to awaken
43 Ibid., p. 51.
44

.ru.g,.,

p. 54.
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mass consciousness of the need to replace atate institutions
which has characterized the Latin American revolution as a
coup d'etat, even when conducted in the name of the masses.
Such "putsches",. observes Debray, are compelled to base
themselves on existing institutions (established economic
institutions, the army. etc.) in order to win th e quick support
of the expectant people. Aaka Debray,
Sinc.e the masses lack political consciousness
or organization--things which can only be acquired in
a long and difficult ~evolutionary experience--on whom
can the government b&ae itself? Bow can it ask for
the sacrifices which a real policy of national independence would demand, if the peasantry and above all
the working-class are not convinced of the need for
them? 4 ~

The answer, of course, is the revolutionary foco,
which awakens the masses as it struggles to seize power from
the existing State,

contains the revolutionary State--a

counter-State--in embryo, and engages in praxis upon which
to develop for implementation a new program for society.

The

foco must disregard the national bourgeoisie, since this strata
is now well aware of the process it would unleash by engaging

in a genuine bourgeois-democratic revolution to free the
peasantry. and proceed to do the revolution--an event
45

Ibid., p. 19.

.unavoidab~

r
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socialist at its termination.

As Debray makes explicit in his

second New Left Review essay, "Marxist Strategy in Latin
America":

46

To say that it has fallen to the proletariat
and the peasants to accomplish the historic,tasks of
the bourgeoisie is to say that the alternative today
is not between (peaceful) bourgeois revolution and
(violent) socialist revolution as tha promoters of the
Alliance for Progress claimed, in agreement with the
reformists, but between revolution tout court andcounter-revolution •••• 47 (emphasis by author)
Debray points out that to do otherwise, to "play" at
revolution, is to fall victim of a dilemma which grants two
'

ways of losing to the unaware revolutionary1

he is eithera

victim of a military coup during which he is jailed, exiled,
or buried1 or he ascends to power, and by virtue of existing
conditions and institutions, becomes an "armed demagogue, charg
ed with sending revolutionaries to prison, exile,· or the grave
(demo-bourgeois fascism)."
Up to now, we have

48
exami~ed

Regis Debray•s importance.

We have discovered, and to a degree discussed, his "nitch"

within the Marxist construct.

Discussion has purposely been

devoid of value judgments, since such discernment is
47 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
48

!Bi.9.•

I

P• 38.

r

43

i

unnecessary for an exploratory examination.

What we now

have is background substantial enough to provide historical
perspective and insight, and objective enough to prevent
blurred vision. We know Debray is important to socialist
circles, for his foundation is undeniably Marxist while his
challenge is surely crucial to revolutionol09y in Latin
America.

What must follow at this juncture is a look into

Debray's relevance to friend and for, philosophically speaking.
To preface this next segment, I will briefly mention
the points I consideras most urgent to Debray•s uniqueness
as a revolutionary within the revolution. By no mere
coincidence,

~t

is these points which receive the brunt of

his detractors' critiques.

Fundamentally, I perceive two

issues serving as the crux to the message of Regis Debray.
One, Debray's emphasis upon praxis, and it as a source of
theory in Latin America, within the unit of theory and practice
I

conceptr and, two, his affirmation that therevolution in Latin
America is to be socialist in nature rather .than bourgeoisdemocratic or national-revolutionary, the latter being the
name Lenin agreed to in dference to Roy during the Second
' 49

Comintern Congress.

49
Lenin Selected Works, Vol. 3, .22•

l

.£!.!., p. 457.
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The question of orthodoxy is, of course, begged throughout an examination of this sort.

After all is said and done,

however, it is fruitless to proclaim a definitive value
judgment regarding Debray•s loyalty to the conceptual entity
named Marxism-Leninism, supposedly the contemporary measuring
stick for determining orthodoxy.

The reason is simple: there

can be no clear and final answer.

For example, where Debray

and Lenin agree on the feasibility of "skipping" the capitalist stage of development by successful revolutionary countries,

they disagree as to the role of the party.

Does disagreement

on the latter subject preclude agreement on the former?

We

know that Lenin, speaking of the revolution omitting the
capitalist stage, admitted that "The necessary means for this
cannot be indicated in advance, these will be prompted by
practical experience."

50

But, wculd he have allowed

"practical experience" to discredit the role of the Party?
These are impossible questions. Being t.hat this inability
to contrast and blend Marxism-Leninism with Debray has
largely come about due to something unforseen by Lenin and
uncontrolled by Debray, it becomes near-absurdity to try
SOibid., p. 460.
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dictum Romanus on the question of orthodoxy--yes or no-concerning Regis Debray.
What is of value is an examination of the "something"
mentioned above, whichhappens to be capitalism and, especially,
its influence and control over lesser developed and nonindustrialized countries.

Hence, ·before striking out upon

a discourse of the points already identified as crucial to
Debray

(praxis and the exciUsion of a bourgeois revolution),

I will prepare the discussion with a glance at the unpredictablE
actor of this political scenario, imperialism.
It would be disastrous to view Marxism, especially from.
the period of the Comintern•s theses on the colonial question
on up to Debray•s Revolution in the Revolution?, as a revolutionary doctrine developing in some sort of socio-political
vacuum.

Th! fact is, Marxist revolutionology has a history

of "adjusting" to changes made by its antagonist, the
capitalist order--even to
by such men as

c.

th~

point of evoking questions

Wright Mills as to whether or not there

still exists a warm body qualified to be cal.led an authentic

r
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Marxist.

51

Indeed, Lenin himself found it necessary to

produce a "Marxist response" to capitalism's urmxpected
"moribund" stage by writing his treatise, AmP.erialism, The
Highest State of Capitalism.

In fact, it was the insight of a

new era of capitalist expansion claimed by Lenin

52

which

provided the Comintern (Third International), and especially
the §econd Congress, with its raison d'etre.

Thus, it is not

surprising that Debray, in both of his New Left Review essays
speaks of another effect upon the struggle caused by the
United States• change of tact, a change of tact brought on
by the Cuban succeas.

Although the "change" Debray comments

on is somewhat less profound than that which Lenin observed,
in that Debray's is more an increase in the weight of oppressio
within the exploited region, whereas Lenin perct!ived a
geographical move of the focus of capitalist exploitation from.
51

"L.ater .thinkers and actors have used, revised, elaborated his ,LMarx',!/ ideas, and set forth quite new doctrines,
theories, and strategies. In one way or another, these are
indeed~sed Upon Marx,•
although they can be identified
with classical Marxism only by those who feel they must
distort intellectual and political history for their unMarxist need for certainty through orthodoxy." See, c.
Wright Mills, The Marxists (New Yorks Dell, 1962), p. 131.
52

The concept had, in fact, been first pursued by a
non-Marxist British Economist, J. A. Jobson, Some Fifteen
Years Before Lenin, not to forget Rosa Luxemburg's discussion
of it three years before Lenin.

r
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the European cities to the "backward" countries. both men
accept the axiom that revolutionary Marxism must adjust
accordingly to changes in the capitalist system.
Debray alludes to two facts:

first, that Latin America

has suffered less of a colonial oppression and more of a
capitalist imperialism than other territories. As I pointed
out earlier. Debray holds that this historical situation
has served to narrow the revolutionary base and antiforeigner element of the revolution.

Secondly, the effect

of the Cuban success has been an increased awareness and
determination on the past of the United States to suppress
similar revolutions in the future.

Stating the axiom, "A

socialist revolution also revolutionizes c:mnter-revolution,"
Debray goes on to reveal that the Cuban success has "condemned to failure any mechanical attempt to
experience of the Sierra Maestra."

54

repea~

the

The pulse of

Debray;s two facts is that Latin America has historically
confronted an unusual imperialsim, is presently facing a
revised challenqe and, in general, is the primary victim
of a new imperialism.
53wew Left Review, Issue #45, p. 21.
54

.
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Despite Debray's apparent accuracy on this matter,
he can not be credited with discussing this "new imperialsim"
to any great depth.

And being that the imperialist challenge

seems to be the hiddal:prime mover, as it was likewise in
Lenin's time, in determining the tactical manifestations of
the revolutionology preached by Debray, a closer look at
imperialism is certainly in order before taking up the
observations and conclusions made by Debray.
An essay in Monthly Review by economist Harry Magdoff
entitled "The Aqe of Imperiali8tn"

51:\

provides us with an

incisive Marxist analysis of contemporary capitalist
imperialism.

Says Maqdoff:

The imperialism of today has several distinctly
new features. These are, in our opinion: (l) the
shift of the main emphasis from rivalry in carving up
the world to the struggle against contraction of the
imperialist systemr (2) the new role of the United
States as organizer and leader of the worle imperialist
systemt and (3) the ri@g of technology which is international in character.v
It is well worth my mentioning that in his essay
Magdoff marks the Russian revolution in 1917 as the beginning
of the newPl.ase of imperialism.

The chief result of Russia's

revolution was to introduce into the world capitalist system
55
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"the urge to reconquer that part of the world which had opted
out of the imperialist network."

As Magdoff puts it, the

break up of colonial empires following World War I I served
to intensify the struggle, for although the a::>lonies were
released, they had been interwoven into the prevailing
capitalist arrangement.

The task now of the United States,

concludes Magdoff, is to prevent these former colonial
possessions, e.g., Viet Nam, from leaving the established
system.
On the matter of the United States becoming the major

organizer and leader of the imperialist network, we are able
to see how the increasing technoloqical lead of the United
States corresponded to its increasing responsibility for
"enforcing" the arrangement.

Mr. Magdoff, wishing to illus-

trate the extent of United States military commitment,
reveals that the United States has its armed forces
represented ("through distribution of military assistance
and the direction of military training of foreign armies") in
a total of sixty-four countries, as compared to three during
the 1920's and thirty-nine during World War II.
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Quite

significantly, so Mr. Magdoff tells us, was the corresponding
57
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increase in the quality and global nature of post-World War II
technology.

Increased research, atomic energy, space

satellites, etc., all joinedto improve technology and,
coincidentally, the manner of capitalist oppression.
Without becoming excessively entangled at this time
in Mr. Magdoff's fascinating analysis, I do wish to capture
the essence of his message, which is that,
The internationalization of capital among the
great firms although there are more rival countries now,
the power has shifted into the hands of a relative small
number of integrated industrial and financial firms
is of a much higher order today than was the case
fifty years ago when Lenin wrote his work on imperial.
58
ism.
·
With Barry Magdoff's'analysis of "new imperialism"
having been reviewed, even though in the most briefest
fashion, we can better discern the whole of which Debray
speaks only partially.

The zeal with which

~~pitalism,

i.e.,

the United States, baa fought to maintain the politicoeconomic status quo in Latin America, and

e~perially

in

light of Fidel Castro's success in Cuba, is actually' part
of a changing imperialism.
Schafik Handal, member of the Communist Party of
Salvador, makes this pertinent and supplementary observations
58
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"A few years ago the continental tactics of U.S. imperialism
vacillated between

organizing armed coups and supporting

military dictatorships ••• and encouraging reformism and
'representative democracy'."
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These opposing approaches would

alternate in periods of ascendency, being given the name of the
statesman in charge, e.g., Roosevelt, Dulles, Kennedy and Mann.
But, this exchanging of opposing methods has ended and, as
Handel continues to observe, "Today, the

imp~rialists

pursue

a flexible policy in which both methods are employed either
in turn or simultaneously, depending on the situation ... 60
We are now prepared to return to the first of two
significant points regarding Regis Debray, his emphasis
upon praxis.

And there is no better way to begin than to

present Debr•y,•s own words on this important and controversial
subjects
Thus d?.:1& a divorce of several decades• duration
between Marxist theory and revolutionary practice. As
tentative and tenuous as the +econciliation may appear,
it is the guerrilla movement--master of its own political
leadership--that embodies it, this handful of men ..with
no other alternative but death or victory, at moments.
58
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when death was a concept a thousand times more real,
and victory a myth that only a revolutionary can dream
of."
(Che) r.rhese men may die, but others will replace
them. Risks must be taken. The union of theory and
practice is not an inevitability but a battle, an'i no
battle is won in advance. If this is not achieved
there, it will not be achieved anywhere.61

There are two obvious statements contained in the above
excerpt:

(1)

there has existed a "divorce" between Marxist

theory and revolutionary practice in Latin America: and
(2) such a "union" is possible, and the guerrilla unit
embodies the union of theory and practice (for Latin America).
As I have stated earlier, The Marxist theory-practice
concept is at the core of the Debray philosophy.

It is from

this essential pivot that subsequent ideas about the foco
make sense.

However, it is on this aspect of his work that

Debray receives considerable criticism. For example, we have
Andre G. Frank

and~.

A. Shah, writing in Monthly Review,
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who statd unequivocally that "Debray divorces, or fails to
marry, revolutionary theory and revolutionary practice." This
is, of course, in sharp contrast to Debray's own words.
Actually, the matter is quite uncomplicated.

The

controversy is rooted in differing interpretations of where
Latin America is in the dialectical process.
61Debray, Revolution, o • cit.,p.107.

In fact, this
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controversy is similar to what engaged in between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks during the pre-revolutionary years
.

.

in Russia.

63

Where during the early years of the 1900's the

Mensheviks believed Russia was following the dialectic by
embarking upon a burgeois-democratic capitalism, which
required their "legal" participation, Lenin held that it was
the task of the revolutionary vanguard of the preletarian,
i.e., Lenin's Bolshevik Party, to gain ascendency over the
bourgeois-democratic revolution by activist means.

Both camps

sought, roughly speaking, the Marxist-socialist revolution, but
Lenin "re-defined" the course of the dialectic had taken.
Hc"nce, in a similar fashion do Debray and his critics compete.
Believing as did Russia's "legalists" (later, Mensheviks)
that armed confrontation would primarily be a result of (a) an
an intensification of the objective conditions by the
dialectical process within a developing Russian capitalism,
and (b) an increased class consciousness (the subjective
conditions) brought about by essentially non-armed tactics,
63 1 purposely discount controversy with the Social
Revolutionary Party (Founded in 1901, and considered the
auccessor of the Narodnik left-wing) as being relevant because
although the SRP urged peasant militancy, its a:>ncept of the
Revolution was openly outside a Marxist context.
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much of today's "left" strenuously opposes Debray's suggestion
that the armed struggle by a foco becomes the means

~f

prompt-

ing the subjective conditions in Latin America. As I have
shown, Debray is accused of divorcing theory from practice
and, secondarily, of not proving that the objective conditions are matured in Latin America.

Of the second accusation

Debray is vulnerable. But then again, and assuming Debray's
defense, how does one "prove" the status of the objective
conditions?

Even Lenin in The Development of Capitalism in

Russia, his only work approximating an analytical commentary
on the question of objective conditions, aimed not so much
at "proving" the actual e:xistence of objective conditions,
as much as he did aim at convincing the rural-oriented
Narodniks that Marxism, with its vanguard of the urban
proletariat, was applicable to Russia.

~or

Lenin, the

major clue that the objective conditions were in operation,
aside from his own faith, was the occurrence of worker
strikes during the 1890's which, subsequently, provided the
basis for his early theoretical work on the Party, What Is
To Be Done.

We can also observe the impact on Lenin of the

Russian insurrection of 1905 by reading the following
~

paragraph taken from his "Lecture on the 1905 Revolution:"
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The real education of the masses can never be
separated from their independent political, and
especially revolutionary, struggle. Only struggle
educates the exploited class. Only struggle discloses
to it the magnitude of its own power, widens its horizons,
enhances its abilities, clarifies its mind, forges its
will. That is why even reactionaries had to admit that
the year 1905, the year of struggle, 'f7he "mad year,"
definitely buried patriarchal Russia.64
Hence-, Lenin's way to theory, aside from the
light" provided by Karl Marx, was through praxis.

11

guiding

And so it

is with Regis Debray and his supposed "inversion 11 of theory
and practice.
Debray, particularly in his piece Marxist Strategy
in Latin America,

65

has noticed that the

failur~,

of social

and political revolutionary movemnets is due to (a) the
I

unusual political situation of Latin America, already
discussed: and (b) the failure of Latin America's left to
look to their own praxis for theoretical inspiration.

So,

as Debray has drawn the theory of the foco from the
unique Latin American past and experience with the hope of
attacking

imperialism~

efforts (e.g., Peace Corps, Alliance

for Progress) to squelch a rising social awareness of the
objective conditions by attacking the State structures, which
64 Lenin Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 792.
65
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have made fascist-demo regimes and reformist tendencies unavoidable occurrences, his critics see him as ignoring theory.
The reason is simple:

the "theory" held by those critical of

Debray is textbook or Menshevik-like Marxism, which may have
some claim to orthodoxy in a scholarly-debative sense, but is
looked upon by many contemporary revolutionaries as being
morte.

Hence, as L.:min broke with the Mensheviks and as

Mao Tse Tung took to the countryside with a four-·class
alliance philosophy,. i)cbray has, so to speak, taken to the
mountains with a theory that has been drawn not from the
Russian, Chinese, or Vi:tnamese experiences, but from that
which has taken place in Cuba and seems true for the rest of
Latin America.

In essence, where Debray believes that Latin

America has suffered under a bourgeoisie unable to complete
the bourgeois-democratic revolution (precisely the argument
forwarded by Lenin in defending the Bolshevik's need to seize
power from the floundering bourgeoisie), his critics insist
that he prove pbjectiveconditions will not bring on an era
during which the existing Party approach will become relevant and effective.

Debray is stating:

the link between

imperialism and the Latin American State is such that an
"abberrated" bourgeois situation exists requiring the seizure
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of State power by the best means possible, which to Debray
is a mass movement initiated and led by the uncorruptable
guerrilla foco.

To those critics who charge him with divorc-

ing theory from practice, e.g., Frank and Shah, SWeezy, Silva,

6

Debray presumably would say that the current situation in
Latin America is one in which the unity of theory and practice is actually inept theory wedded to foreign practice.
That is, it is theory drawn from outside the unique Latin
American situation, distilled into activities which, despite
their bringing some class awareness (much like the trade unionist •truqgle Lenin praised, but regarded as insufficient, in
What

ls_~o

Be Done), succeed chiefly in perpetuating the State

which the movement ostensibly opposes.
To Debray, the unity of theory and practice means
an indigenous revolutionary theory (the foco) baaed on
Marx's guide lines which, put into practice, is at once an
improvement of earlier ideas and, by means of praxis, a creator
of new and higher insight.

The doctrinal aura, although

differing in particularities, is Leninist by inclination.

We

might say that Debray•s claim as a Marxist is as real as is
66
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Lenin's Marx-ist authenticity--a point of continuing polemics.
If the evidence presented thus far is insufficient to

show Debray's Leninist roots on the matter of praxis, we have
these revealing words by Regis:
The theory of the i2..s.Q. Lauthor's emphasi.!/ can be
best situated among the current political concepts, by
relating it to the Leninist theory of the weakest link~
which it merely re-interprets in different conditions. 7
(emphasis added)
The second point of significance I listed earlier
regarding the work of Debray is his handling of the traditional question within the "backward" countriesa
revolution to be socialist or national-democratic?
of preface, I would like to

add~that

Is the

By way

Robin Blackburn and

Perry Anderson, editors of New Left Review, declare Debray's
answer as an "enormous liberation"

f:~an

"the traditional and

paralyzing debates on the continent over the 'stages' of the
68
revolution •••• "
Debray's answer, that it must be socialist,
and for the reasons discussed earlier, is an excellent example
of his allegiance--for better or for worse--to an emphasis on
praxis and, consequently, the Bolshevik-styled perception of
67
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the revolution.

His answer on this

ll'll

tter is clearly a

product of a particular predisposition regarding the unity
of theory and practice. In content, his answer states:

0

It

seems evident that in South America the bourqeois-democratic
stage presupposes the destruction of the bourgeois State
apparatus."

69

In actuality, the answer is mere a conclusion

than a "formulation," the term given to it by supporters of
Debray, Blackburn and Anderson.

For, it com.es only_after

Debrary tells us in Latin Americas The Long March how Latin
American experience at, for example electoral participation
(Chile), at urban guerrilla movements (Venezuela), and military
putschism has been fouIXled on foreign Marxist theory or on
no theory at all, and has achieved its success in making his
philosophy a matter of utmost urgency, or so Debray implies.
In order to fully understand the content of this
conclusion we must progress to Debray•s thoughts on nationalism.

And here again, Debray stresses the extraordinary

situation experienced by Latin America.

Calling attention to

the fact that Latin America's struggle is not one towards
freedom from colonial oppression, but primarily one towards
ending neo-colonialism, i.e., the internal influence and
69New Left Review, #33, p. 51.
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external grip of economically inspired and maintained imperial-

ism.

This creates a certain path for the revolution. Writing

in his earlier essay, Latin America: The Long March, and referring to his prime source of inspiration, Cuba, Debray explains
this revolutionary coursea
There is a i •• a reason why Fidelism lays a greater
stress on revolutionary practice, when it is honest
and sincere, than on ideological labels1 this is
the belief that, in the special conditions of South
America, the dvnamismof nationalist stru3gles brings
them to a conscioqs adoption of Marxism. 7 (emphasis
~de~
·
We ·are prompted to ask what is the basis of Debray's
belief that "a genuine nationalism in Latin America implies
the final overthrow of the semi-colonial State, the destruc71
tion of itz a.rmy, and the installation of Socialism."
(emphasis added)
ienee.

The answer lies in. as expected, past exper-

Debray·points out that. traditionally, the I:atin

American national State has received the bulk of national
discontentment.

owing to the unique .and overwhelming influence

and staying power of imperialism, and the ancestoral possession
of political power by indigenous groups, the primary
political struggle has been between factions within the
dominant class (exporters and industrialists).
70
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The result.
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as seen by Debray, has been a distortion of the real contradiction between Nation and Imperialism.

Thus, Debray's warning,

"One must, therefore, always specify at what level opposition
is situated:

anti-governmental or anti-imperialist,"

reflects the essence of the problem: to awaken the uninvolved masses and destroy the State form which is
irrevocably bound to dependence upon imperialism.
In his review of Latin American nationalism, Regis
Debray resorts to the same technique as used by him to survey
past actions of the Left--recapitulation of errors--to
present us with the background for his beliefs.

Seeking to

define his "model" Fidelism, also named revolutionary nationalism, Debray tells us first what is is not:
11

.tsrn 11 •

an ideological

It is distinct from bourgeois nationalism, which

demands industrial and commercial protectionism in pursuance
of a national State founded on industrial development (e.g.,
Frigerio in Argentina, Jaraguilia in Brazil); and is distinct from the nationalist and democratic government sought
by most communist partie·s in Latin America because it,
••• is organically linked to a socialist programme
and it aims at the transformation of State power by
means of its ccmquest and the destruction of the bourgeois
form •••• It thus considers as illusory and ineffectual
the partial demands, the transactions or the conciliations
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of an eventual 'national government' which works for a
revolution which woolcl advance in small steps.72
Debray also takes up what he identifies as the two
most historically important forms of nationalism in Latin
America:

Bonapartist nationalism and populism.

Both of which

sought to nni te the proletariat and the bourgeoisie under the

·

,1

leadership of the latter.
In the case 8f populism as symbolized by Vargas of
Brazil, an attempt at unity is made by utilizing antiYankeeism. But, as Debray laments, such a tact eventually
capitulates to United States influence because, not being
led by a socialist proletariat, the dominant bourgeoisie is
in a position "to come to an 'understanding' with U.S.
imperialism."
With Bonapartist natim;.&lism, attempts are made at
structural reforms from above.

Lacking are changes in State

power and a conscious movement of thP. masses.

The result,

reports Debray, is something considerably less than meaningful change due to bourgeo-institutional resistance to substantial alterations.
72
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Again and again, we are compelled to confront the
weight of De,bray • ~5 allegiance to praxis-inspired philosophy.
In discussing these nationalisms we must meet face to face
Debray' s contf.:-ntic11 that the existing State, an abberrated
bourgeois power structure, does in fact rule and, in reality,
pases as the major obstacle to a socialist movement.
We also see that Debray's program ccintains a puzzling

allusion to nationalism via socialism.

Unfortunately for

academic inquiry, he fails to spell out precisely the nature
of "revolutionary nationalism."

We have only indications,

such as the following statement:

I

Fidelism Lrevolutionary nationalism/ is not a
special qualification, a constituted vanguard, a
part of a band of conspirators linked to Cuba. Fidelism is only the concrete process of the regeneration
of Marxism and Leninism i~ Latin American conditions
and according to the historical tradition of each
country. It will never be the same from one country
to the next; it can only conquer through originality.
Let us hope that even the word disappears.73
Hence, the revolutionary nationalism of which Regis
Debray speaks, appears to allude to the mood and reason
under which the people of Latin America are to move towards
73

Ibid. , p. 58.

64

revolution.

Rat.her than bc:ing both the motive and the goal

of certain human-political activities, Debray allows it to be
solely a

motiv~.

In this way, he is telling us that due to

the presence of bourgeois-States, the oppression of imperialism
is most directly perceived by the oppressed within a nationstate context.

The revolutionary surge is directed at ending

the undesired effects already described and considered residual to the variations ov classical nationalism.

Debray's

nationalism is in effect, anti-nationalism1 or as he terms
it, revolutionary nationalism.

With this in mind we are

better able to understand Debray's remark:
_ A summary dialectic would thus make of Fidelism
Lrevolutionary nationalis.m/ an a posteriori synthesis
of two currents, national and international, nationalist and communist. 74
(author's emphasis)

74
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SECTION II

W1=:

know

Rc~gis

Debray was apprehended in a village

of Bolivia late in 1967 while returning from some time spent
with Che Gue\1 ara.

Alt.hough having engaged in one year of

guerrilla activities, Guevara's lack of initial success was

a fact. Confirmed by his recnetly published diary,

1

increasing army expertise and, most significantly, peasant
apathy were the hurdles Guevara was unabli!? to leap. For
instance, we see Guevara lamenting over worsening conditions
in a monthly summary (September, 1967):

" ••• now the anny is

showing more effectiveness in action, and the mass of
peasants does not help us at bl.ll and have become informers. 112
The pertinence of this stems from the fact that Che Guevara,
aside from having in large measure inspired the foco theory

I

I
.I

as a revolutionary in Cuba, was proceeding upon the foco
technique in Bolivia.
1

In a real sense, Regis Debray and

See, Ramparts, July, 1 ~,68.

2 Ibid.,
.
p. 6 8.

65

66

Che Guevara were complementary:

Debray, th$ revolutionary

advocate: Guevara, the revolutionary practitioner.

Therefore,

Che Guevara's failure to spark the revolution in Bolivia must
cast the shadow of failure upon Debray and his work.

To para-

phrase Lenin, false theory will produce unsuccessful practice,
and it certainly appears to have done so in the Bolivian
episode.
The first and most
foco concept erroneous?

obviou~

question asks:

Is the

Almost spontaneously, we are

inclined to conclude "yes".

For if Che Guevara's failure in

Bolivia is not sufficient evidence, the apparent failures of
the focos in Guatemala, Venezuela, Peru, and Colombia

3

tend

to provide overwhelming snpport for those who would disavow
the foco theory.

These numerous failures make us first

recall Debray's remark about revolution revolutionizing the
counter-rev~lution,

and then wonder if perhaps Debray had

unknowingly uttered in advance the reason for his doctrine's
failure in Bolivia.

Perhaps Guevara's notations about the

increasingly effective Bolivian army were belated reminders
....

~"see, Dissent, May-June, 1968.

"The Myth of The
Guerrilla," Luis Mercier Vega,pp. 210-215.
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of an underestimation of the degree to which the counterrevolution has been revolutionized.
There is still the problem of an apathetic and untrustworthy peasantry.
of more than one factor.

Such a condition could be the result
Besides government attempts to

improve their lot, there exists, for example, the peasants'
dislike for

11

outsiders 11 1 their vulnerability to government

propaganda or monetary inducements1 and, last, their actual
contentment.

But all these points, in the final analysis,

becane quite secondary.

Perhaps the peasantry should be

approached in some fasion other than solely throuqh "example
by military confrontation."

That is, maybe there exists a

tactical middle-qround between Debrar's organizational
suggestion, and the concept of "armed propaganda," so hated
by Debray.

I repeat, these are secondary points \<fl ich bear

chiefly on tactics.

When all is said and done, no one can

be certain if the foco technique, especially in Bolivia, has
met with failure because it was acc6mpanied by improper
tactics (e.g., severely limited contact with peasants, lack
of substantial indtgenous rural representation in the
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foco,

4

etc.), or if the Marxist prognosis, at least as it is

defined by Debray, is fantasy from the start.

Thus, to

discourse on such details would be fruitless for the purposes
of this study.

And at this·ambiguous'juncture in Latin Arner-

ican revolutionology--represented by such men as Regis Debray o
the left, Schafik Handal in the center, and Luis Sanchez on the
right--it is impossible to be definitive in labeling a philosophy's status.

For the time being, I prefer to confine

myself to interpreting the effects of the most immediate
condition of

Debr•J'·~s

philosophy, especially as it is affec-

ted by Che Guevards failure, rather than being foolish enough
to assume the future by pronouncing sentence.
In place of evaluation, I choose to submit and pursue
the issue of relevance. And actually, is this not the realistic thing to do?

What historian, as he glances back

through the years, concentrates on determining the rightness
or wrongness of a philosopher?

What is of interest, surely,

is a man's relevance to his past, present, and future.

The

failure, even if momentary, of a man's ideas can be, and
often are, the reason for his increased relevance at a later
time.

Let us recall such diverse men as Socrates, Jesus,
4As Vega points out, most Latin American guer~illas are

6~j

Luther and Galileo.
R turning to DE:·bray, we may begin an examination Df
1

his relevance: by turning to his impact upon established Marxist
governn1cnts.

The first problem

WE

encounter is defining

"established Marxist governments."
-Jf great proportions, but I

This entire issue is one

shall become arbitrarily academic

by limiting this 02scription to the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe.

Despite the so-called polycentrism of the communist

movement within this area, the fact that these countries posses:
a long national tradition as nations, are actively engaged
in indigenously supported industrialism, and are relatively
strong

par~icipants

in international

political-econon~ic

intercourse makes them peculiar to a common

category~

The; characteristic most noteworthy within this category

is a preponderance Df "nation-state-ism".

I

have purposely

omitted the term "nationalism" simply because it fails to
stress the effects of the State in the nationalism of nationstates.

~- ~

wishing to go into great lengths, I do want to

draw attention to the fact that the nation-state arrangement
has produced little discomfort fc1r capitalist oriented
States.

More0ver. the arrangement is often beneficial in

making profits, expansion, and order possible.

Conversely,
'

r
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the sovereign, nation-state organization of human societies
has presented itself as an enigma to especially the soviet
Union.

Being the first to leave the capitalist cx:>mmunity of

states, the Soviet Union had the job of coming to ideological
grips with the fact that it would exist surrounded for some
time by capitalist states.

As I mentioned earlier, Lenin's

law of unequal and uneven development and Trotsky's
"permanent revolution" were both attempts to face this
reality.

It is not necessary to investigate these concepts

or socialist expansion, for the point I wish to make concerns
the degree to which the Soviet Union, despite its foundation
of Marxist internationalism, was forced by the nation-state
arrangement to behave as a State. This tendency of course,
reached is highest expression in Stalin's "socialism in one
country. "

Itr is needless to go into depth on the matter in

order to establish the point.

The Soviet Union's participation

in World War II, or its attempt to place offensive missiles in
Cuba,

5

are just two examples of the unavoidable effects of the
5

It matter not why one plays the game, but only that
one plays. Bence, that the Soviet Union's actions may !are
been "defensive" does not totally discharge the fact she is
participating.
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nation-state arrangement upon Marxism hopelessly encased within

a nation-state.
Having become obvious participants in nation-state
a~~airs,

the established Marxist governments must look at an

ardent revolutionary such as Regis Debray with something more
than purely fraternal eyes.

Because they have witnessed

first hand the inability of a shared belief in the Marxian

.

message to maintain solidarity, the Soviets and the nations
\

of eastern Europe must regard Debray as a factor in the

power struggle among States.

The Soviets have only to

remind themselves of maverick Cuba, not forgetting that it
is Debray's source of inspiration, to realize the repelling
qualities of nation-state·-ism, even within internationalist
Marxism.
That Regis Debray virtually raads the Corrununist
Party out of Latin American revolutionary affairs serves only
to intensify his relevance to the established Marxist
governments.

According to Lenin andthe Third International,

the revolution in the backward regions can only occur when
the class struggle is taken to the countryside and "the rural
working masses are united about the Conununist Party of the
6 Lenin Selected Works, Vol. 3, 2.2.• cit., p. 42~'·
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urban :;iroletariat. 116

To tee extent that Debray threatens the

Soviet State, and its arm the Communist Party, byhis belief
that "there is ••• no metaphysical equation in which

vanguard - Marxist-Leninist Party,

11

7

Debray is something less

than a favorable element in ::he Soviet Union's already
uncertain status regarding State influence in the developing
countries.

And as a natio!!·-otate intimately committed to,

and dependent on, the "communist way," the polycentrism of
the Party, coupled with tr;c Debray overture to revolutionaries
outside the already questioning Party, makes for a precarious
power-political situation as far as established Marxist governments are concerned.
Regis Debray's relevance to contemporary Marxist
revolutionaries has already been hinted at in this study.
In essence, Debray, aside from the actual performance of his
philosophy, has served as a provocateur of new thought.

His

influence continues today, for one can now detect a new sense
of urgency in the Marxist mood within Latin America.

Writing

in support of theoretical works, Schafik Handal concedes that:
OLenin Selected ·works, Vol. 3,
7
oebray, Revolution, p. ~s.

OE,.

cit., p. 429.
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The call for a new kind of discussion, for
joint efforts in theory, should not be interpreted
as a pDoposal to discontinue all action for the duration
of the debate and the elaboration of theory. Quite
the reverse. Revolutionary action must develop in
scope and theory, because, among other things, it is
action and practig4 that will resolve the controversial
issues.8 (emphasis added)
Clearly, the writings of Regis Debray have given
impetus to a Marxist approach in Latin America best described
as "impatient revolution."

And depending upon one's political-

philosophical predisposition, Debray•s call to arms can be
given one of the following perspectivesa
(1) correct, because Debrazy·'s belief that
objective cond1tions are ripe in Latin America, the
foco technique will eventually prove to be best, and
the revolution can be carried off without the Communist Partyr

(2) incorrect, because Debrar•s assumptions,
as stated in #1, are not acceptabler or
(3) incorrect, because the Marxist analysis
is erroneous (dialectical materialism, the inevitability of class struggle anc revolution, etc.).
Regarding number one, very little can be added to what
has already been presented.

The revoltionology of Regis Debray

is openly baaed on the idea that Latin America is ready for
revolt, and that the main obstacle to revolution is the lack
of consciousness.

Viewed by Debray, the Latin American

scene shows that it has been the army, serving as the
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oppressive arm of the bourgeois regimes in power, and the
impotent and reformist measures by existing Marxist-Leninist
parties unable to progress because of unusual conditions in
Latin America, which hav

combined to prevent the classical

revolutionary awareness and, consequently, an effective
agency to make the revolution.
Criticism of Debray by his Marxist peers, the objective
of perspective number two, has covered every aspect of Debray's
work.

To be sure, they have disputed his interpretation of

the objective conditions, his opinion of the Party, and his
use of the foco.

However, after close analysis, it appears

that much of the criticism levelled at Debray arises from an
"over-reading" of his thoughts or intentions.

For example,

when speaking of the position taken by Debray concerning the
objective conditions in Latin America, his critics seem to
miss the full meaning of Debbray's allusiton to the foco as
the "small motoru.

What Debray implies throughout his

writings--perhaps his greatest fault (not having had the
benefit of hindsight) is found in his failure to stress this
aspect explicitly--is the notion that the readiness of the
objective conditions cannot be contingent upon academic
analysis or dissertation, but only upon action.

And while
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testing the objective conditions through activity, guerrilla
action coincidentally serves to hasten along the development
0f the subjective conditions, i.e., the social awareness of the

masses.

After the "take-off stage 11 has been achieved, and the

foco is gaining participants and awakening the consciousness
of the population, the struggle is to move forward with the
foco being only one factor, albeit the central one, among
many diverse elements, e.g., students, trade unions, peasant
leagues, etc.

~'

Hence, Debray critic, Donald McKelvey,

provides us with a worthwhile observation when he remarks:
Revolution in the Revolution? Is in fact a
very narrCM book, for it c:>ncentrates on a very limited
period of time in the revolutionary process. This does
not make it bad or worthless-quite the contrary. But
it is a vast mistake, an historical abberration, to
attempt to apply universally the truths and lessons
of that limited period.lo
(author's emphasis)
It is with McKelvey's final point about the error of.
unj. versally applying certain truths that Debray' s work is
challenged.

Perhaps only by default (in that Debray concen-·

trated on merely

th~

tc:Ke-off stage of the revolution, failed

to stress the fact sufficiently, and was imprisoned before he
C1

··See, Monthly Revie!!,, July-August, 1968, p. 68.
10 .
Ilnd., pp. ~·2-~·3.
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could issue sequels) does Debray become vulnerable to this
attack. But the fact is, Debray does seem ambiguous as to
boundaries to which he foresees revolutionaries .in Latin
America being able to wander while they draw from the Cuban
experience, Debrary's. "model."

The weight of the implication

one draws from reading Debray is that he sgggests a virtual
one to cone situation.

However, there appears from time to

time on the pages of Debray•s work rather strong signals
that a one to one lesson is not at all what he has
in mind.

Writing in "Marxist Strategy in Latin America," for

example, Debrary encloses in his concluding paragraph the
sentence, "It Fidelism is no way a closed model: assimilated
and recreated by Latin American masses, it is the guide to the
.

first step towards a continental revolution."

11

Therefore, the only conclusion we can safely forward
is that Debray's conclusion on this issue is based largely
upon an individuals' interpretation of the Debrayan theme.
Perhaps future writing on his part will serve to clarify
this partially clouded question.

While he will need to

elaborate on the subject of "universality," Debray would
11

New Left Review, #45, p. 41.
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be well advised to amplify on his judgments pertaining to
the overall effects in Latin America of earlier struggles by
the Communist Party.

It is true, the thrust of his writings

ostracize the Party and ignore any contributions it may have
made.

But, there appears in "Latin America:

the fellowing warning:

The Long March"

"We should not overlook the debt of

revolutionary nationalism to the actionand propaganda of
Communist Parties, which were the pioneers of reasoned anti-

12
imperialism •.•• "

The implication of this statement is,

of course, that Debray is cognizant of the effects produced by
even the supposedly "ineffectual" Communist Parties of Latin
America.

And since a substantial portion of the criticism

delivered at Debray, especially that of Cuban revolutionaries,
Simon Torres and Julio ArondE', and Brazilian author Clea
Siva,

13

challenges Debray's perception of the need for some

degree of non-guerrilla preparation.

Debray seems to have

errored in not making his precise sentiments on this matter
clear.

12
13

.

New Lift Review, #33, p. 57.
See, Monthly Review, July-August, 1968.
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I believe there is considerable validity to a suggestion
that Debray receives much of his criticism as a result of what
he appears to imply, rather than strictly on the contents of
his work.

His ambiguity on the two issues presented above

illustrate the source c>f confusion which Debray inadvertently
embodied in his published material.

Again I repeat, only the

future can clear the air of these questions.
While speaking of the future, I might add that although
one may say in light of Che Guevara's failure that an examination of Deb ray's Castro-inspired foco theory has become
irrelevant and purely academic, the fact is:
far from being defunct in Latin America.

revolution is

And to the extent

that the foco theory expoused byDebray, as put into practice
by Guevara, has provided a lesson from which to learn, his
ideae are relevant to affaira in Latin America.
Ar1vancing to the third perspective from which Regis
Debray may be viewed, which considers him just another victim
of "Marx's fantasy", we can take note of a criticism of Debray
voiced by "reformist"

Marxists and non-Marxists alike.

Luis

Sanchez of Nicaragua's Socialist Party, who may be placed in
the former category, states in obvious reference to the foco
theory:

"We were guided and continue to be guided by Leninist
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thesis that Marxism recognizes all form of struggle, that it
does not invent the forms and that it draws conclusion:; from
experience gainea. 1114

Such a charge by Sanchez closely

parallels a charge of "Blanguism" by non-Marxists.

It is indeec

paradoxical that both Lenin and Debray were moved to directly
respond to identical charges of Blanquism.
Lenin's response was contained in a letter to the Cent.ral Committee during September of 1917, and it is characterizec
by his own matchless polemical approach. For instance, at the
outset of his letter Lenin notes that, "Bernstein LE'duard
Bernstei_l.L, the leader cf opportunism, has already earned

15
himself unfortunate fame by accusing J\!arxism of Blanquism ••.. "
Lenin's entire le'tter is aimed at explaining and justifying the
seizure of po\,•cr by the Bolsheviks.

Below is a key paragraph

To be successful, insurrection must rely not upon
conspiracy and not upon a party, but upon the advanced
class. That is the first point,
Insurrection must rely
upon a revolutionary upsurge of the people. That is the
second point. Insurrecticn must rely upon that turningpoint in the history of the growing revolution when the
activity of the advanced ranks of the people is at its
14
world Marxist Review, February, 1965, p. 35.

15
Lenin Selected Works, Vol. 2,

.Q.P.·

cit., p. 365.

,
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height, and when the vacillations in the ranks of the
enemy and in the ranks of th(~ weak, half-hearted and
irresolute friends of the revolution are strongest.
What is the third point. And these three conditions
for raising the question of insurrection distinguishing Marxism from Blanquism.16
(author's emphasis)
The point Lenin strives to make is that the insurrec-

tinn, although manifested by the Bolsheviks, must be a product
of a "revolutionary upsurge of the people" prompted by events
and conditions.

Later in hi> letter Lenin states that

insurrection during July 3-4 (1917), as opposed to "the
September day:-;", would have been in error beca.i se: (1) the
Bolsheviks lacked the support of the workers:

(2)

there was

no countrywide revolt at the time; anc (3) there was n:)
"'Jacillation" among th;: enemies and the petty·-bourgeoi.sie.
Contained within bis essay,

"Latin America: The Long

Debray makea a reply to the issue of Blanquism in

Mar~h,"

strikingly similar fashion.

His discussion of the entire

matter revolves around two points:

(1) although the foco

starts as a small group aspiring to the seizure of power, it
is a minority whose plane, "unlike the Blanquist minority of
activi*ts, aims to win ove1 the masses before and not after the
16
Ibid.
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seizure of power, and which makes this the ,essential condition
of the final conquest of power1"

17

and (2) unlike Blanquism.

which sought rapid success and functioned within the elite
working-class of the craft industries, the foco seeks not to
gain power by war or through military defeat of the oppressor,
but thro1,J9li>the action of the masses, i .. e., the poor and medium
peasants, as well as the>.;Work,ers.

Quite

obvio~uJly

the emphasis

by Debray, as it was with Lenin, is on the awakening of the
masses by agitation

de~.igned

to evoke increased repression and

intensification of the class contradictions, and their subsequent participation in removing the existing government.
What is of concern here to the non-Marxist is whether
or not Marxism is proving itself viable.

On the one hand,

Debray charges the existing "Parties" in Latin Amed.ca with
reformism.

While

on

the

~ther

hand, the so-called reformists

suggest DE·bray is promoting a Blanquist-like movement, which ia
an activity shunned even by the
impli~it

cCJmmunists~

This usually

charge is shown in the words of Luis Mercier Vaga,

cited earlier as a critic of the foco theory:

17

New Left Review, #33, p. 27.

8- ....•)

In this period of great transformations that
confront almost all Latin-American countries, the cru~ity
of gue:crilla methods, their remoanticism, their ao.olescent
courage, but also their taste for total power and their
oligarchic contempt for th~ masses whom they judge
incapable of achieving their own emancipation will
doubtless be replaced by a less exalted but no less
difficult search for a revolution that would start
from below1 a revolution made by nonprofessionals& o
18
revolution that starts from--and returns to--the people.
The interested observer is left puzzled, to say the least.
To the non-Marxist, an impression is given that revolutionary
Marxism is in the throes of its own evolutionary disintegration.

If there are any valid grievances to be haard (poverty,

economic domination, oppressive government, etc.), the nonMarxist's perception of them is often and easily befuddled
as his attention is drawn to what appears to be a band of
guerrillas seeking to cause "unnecessary trouble" in the name
of a deceased doctrine named Marxism.
All that remains now is to examine Regis Debray's
relevance to non-Marxist governments, and especially the
United States.

In the final analysis, however, for the United

States to regarp Debray on simply the basis of what he says is
robbing ourselves of his meaning.
Regis Debray is not to be
tacaics~

~onnd

As far as we are concerned,

in a floundering set of

in a comparative analysis of Bolivia and Russia's

,
B3
insurrection in lSOS or Lenin's Bolsheviks of 1917, or in Mao
Tse Tun97s Chinese experience.
becaus~

Rather, Debray has importance

he symbolizes a challenge, one which has the structure

of a question.

And to the degree that Debray is passionately

seeking an answer to this question, which also confronts us,
Debray is relevant.
As we might expect, the question is not altogether
simple, and an answer appears difficult.
tion must proceed.
(1)

Nevertheless, the que -

It is a question with three general facets:

It: asks about freedom and tyranny:

(2)
It asks about the immense economic abundance
and influence in the hands of the advanced industrial
States, and most especially the United States: and
(3)
It asks, although only implicitly, about
nation-states.
Regarding the first point, Debray, perhaps not so
much in words as in general direction, expresses an
impatient desire of

m~ny

in Latin America to flee the

tyranny of injustice, especially the economic kind.
words of James Reston,

In the

"The contrast between the rich and the

.
.
19
poor from Los Angeles to Biafra is hard to Justify."
1 C;
-Chicago's American, August 17, 1965.
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But. this is not to say that Debray of others like him,
in their zeal, are not capable of crC>ating "tyrannies of the
left."

Un~ueationably,

this is a distinct possibility when

political hopes meet harsh realities.

And if we are to

believe Crane Brinton's Anatomy of Revolution, this is a
possibility not totally unexpected of revolutionaries.

How-

ever, this speculative question is irrelevant to this study,
for my aim at this point is merely to avoid the placing of
the "Debrayan Quest" within an irrevocably tyrannical movement
or sentiment.

A passage from Hannah Arendt's On Revolution

has pertinence here:
His ,LMarx',!/most explosive and -indeed most
original contribution to the cause of revolution was
that he interpreted the compelling needs of mass
poverty in political terms as an uprising, not for
the sake of bread or wealth, but for the sake of
freedom as well.20
The point here is that the challenge of deprivation
in the world is too awesome for even the sturdiest of national
boundaries--the hindrances they can be--to •uppress the moral
message which is seeking expression, even though sometimes
imperfectly, in the call to revolution.

20

And in as much as the

Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Hew York: Viking Press,

1963). p. 56.
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status quo "belongs" to the advanced industrial nations in
general, this era of revolution is of primary concern to the
United States and its non-industrialized, non-Marxist allies,
e.g., the countries of Latin America, in particular.
All

11

acceptable '' explanatory reasons notwithstanding,

the dominant industrial countries (the U.S., u.s.s.R., Japan,
and Furope) present themselves in varying degrees as villages
of prosperity surrounded by parched earth.

Much of Asia,

Africa, the Near Fast, and Latin America are, at best, second
class participants in a foreign prosperity-producing arrangement.

And, at worst, they are spectators standing far

afield while the game is being partially played in their
own back yard. Assuming the worst, Regis Debray then becomes
a person who has been impelled to voice concern for the
spectators along the sidelines.

alienat~d

That his ideas are perhaps un-

favorable, even erroneous vis-a-vis acceptable thought within
non-Marxist governmental circles, is decidedly unimportant.
For at this moment, Debray's posisble error does not erase
the chaD..enge or the question.

And, that the United States fails

to comprehend the positive effects of Regis Debray--his amplify
ing the urgency with which a meaningful answer (meaning that it
produces tangible results) to cyclical poverty and oppression
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is being sought--is, however, highly important.

As Arendt

observes, our past record is not much better:
Fear of revolution has been the hidden leitmotif
of post war American foreign policy in its desperate
attempts at stabilization of the status quo, with
the result that American power and prestige were
used and misused to support obsolete and corrupt
political regimes that long since had become objects
of hatred and contempt among their own citizens. 21
Regis Debray is, of course, a revolutionary. For this
reason he is inimical to the politics of those States seeking
to preserve the status quo. But, the plain fact is:

the

impulse for freedom is very much alive in today's world, and
the events surrounding the American blacks, the Czechs, and the
Vietnamese proclaim that men now declare poverty and slavery
intolerable, and domination invalid:

As Reston adds, "The

spirit of equality is challenging the old spirit of domination
in every continent of the globe.

Established institutions,

creeds, and hierarchies are under attack in the communist
and socialist and tribal as well as in the capitalist
22
worlds ••• "
And that Debray has arrived at the conclusion
that the oppression is due to capitalist, and especially
United States' economic motives is certainly not discouraged

-------·--------------------------22

Chicago's American, loc • .£!!..
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by actions on the part of the United States.

Clearly,

"We have acted as though we too believed that it was wealth
and abundance which were at stake :in the postwar conflict

between the 'revolutionary' countries in the Fast and Wc:st."
'I'he United States, however,

is not alone.

Union is properly included in this discussion.

23

The Soviet
Anyone who

has observed the Soviet Union's difficulties in the Third
World, especially in relation to China and Cuba, will realize
that the tension between the advancing industrial States
and the smaller or lesser

developt~d

countries is prompted,

at least in part, by a factor otht?r than purely capitalist
economic exploitation.

This factor is the nation-- state

arrangement.
If only indirectly, Regis Debray, as a representative

voice of oppressed people within a section of the Third World,
challenges the possibility that economic justice and freedom
are able to emerge from the existing nation-state organization
of the world.

In a true sense, a universal morality based

primarily on justice and freedom is coming into view, despite
23

Arendt, loc. cit.

l
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Hans Morgenthau's conclusion that such an occurrence would
require "almost super-human morale strength 1124 on the part
of persons accustomed to national morality.

"A vitality of a

moral system is put to its crucial test when its control of
the consciences and actions of men is challenged by another
system of morality."

25

Stating this accurate prmmise,

Morganthau, writing this soon after World War II, properly
observed the stability of national morality.

Today, however,

this stability is threatened and the nation-states it
justifies, by a tendency on the part of many persons to
apply a universal code of evaluation-- a sort of man to
man analysis-- to problems of War, Peace, Justice, Poverty,
and Freedom.

Almost as if to corroborate Hegel's thesis, a

.l newer seiloe of Right is arriving and qaining in influence.
The net effect of this change in moral perception is an
increasing irrelevance for those nationalistic

aspirati~n~

and fears which heretofore guided moral selectivity.

Their

irrelevance is to the same extent they interfere, so to speak,
24

Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd Edition
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1~65), p. 255.
25

_!bid.
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with the Sermon on the Mount.
It should n.ot be im'?lied from this study that I regard
Regis Debray as the purveyor of the Answer.
he is more a re-affirmation of the question.

The fact is
The answer,

the complex and multi-facted thing it must be, lies in a
profound readjustment of national and international institutions in order to meet the dramatic changes in human moral
perspectives.

Barbara Ward•s suggestion 26 that Western

nations, and the United States in particular, must reexamine the moral message'of the "revolution of liberty"
in order to insure the·· safe transference of liberty is
advice deserving immediate attention and requiring a
courageous response.

Will we do so?

One thing certain is

that the force generated by people in political motions is
simply too great for institutions of the past to withstand.
Change is inevitable.
Regis Debray, then, becomes relevant to us an an
expression of our task.

26

Questions thisstudy provoked,

•
Barbara Ward, The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations,
(New Yorks Norton, 1962), p. 159.

even the unanswered or unan.Werable ones. are part of the
relevance Debray has for us.

Be is not so much a philo-

sophical and political adversary as he is a pang of conscience and a reminder of responsibility.

But. naturally,

a pang of conscience requires cognizance of Right. and we
shall express our moral position only as we seek to answer
the challenges by the "spectators far afield."

The answer,

although not entirely defineable now. is definite only in
its inevitableness.

Our need to act wisely and justly is

unavoidable, for the moment we fail to seek answers is the
minute we surely fail.
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